We analyse empirically whether cooperatives and investor-owned …rms di¤er in terms of productive e¢ ciency. Using rich Portuguese panel data covering a wide range of industries, we apply two di¤erent empirical approaches to estimate potential di¤erences in total factor productivity between the two groups of …rms. The results from our benchmark random-e¤ects model show that cooperatives are signi…cantly less productive, on average, than investor-owned …rms. This conclusion is to a large extent con…rmed by the results from System-GMM estimations. The lower productivity of cooperatives applies to a wide spectrum of industries. In six out of thirteen industries, cooperatives are outperformed by investor-owned …rms in all empirical speci…cations considered, while there is no industry in which cooperatives are consistently found to be the more productive type of …rm.
Introduction
In this paper we document how two di¤erent forms of organizing production a¤ects the productivity of the …rm. More speci…cally, we examine whether and how productive e¢ ciency di¤ers between cooperatives and investor-owned …rms (henceforth IOFs). The dominant type of …rm in modern economies is the IOF, where the right to residual control is assigned to the suppliers of capital in proportion to the capital supplied. Nevertheless, since the start of the modern cooperative movement in the mid-19th century, cooperatives have continued to grow and prosper as an alternative way of organizing production, and they have today a widespread presence is several industries and countries. 1 In many countries, the cooperative is a signi…cant, and sometimes dominant, organizational form in several industries. 2 Despite the worldwide (and in some sectors signi…cant) presence of cooperatives, evidence on the merits of this organizational form with respect to productive e¢ ciency is relatively scarce and far from consensual. Whereas the theoretical literature on cooperatives versus
IOFs is quite rich (though also quite divergent), the empirical evidence is for the most part con…ned to case studies or, at best, industry-speci…c analyses. Furthermore, the available evidence is found in two completely separate and seldom cross-referenced strands of the literature; one on worker cooperatives (labour managed …rms) and another on agricultural producer cooperatives. 3 In the present paper we contribute to the literature by performing a cross-industry empirical analysis of the productivity of cooperatives relative to IOFs, using rich panel data from
Portugal. Applying two di¤erent empirical strategies, random-e¤ect estimation and System-GMM estimation, we estimate di¤erent variants of an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function and test for di¤erences in total factor productivity between cooperatives and IOFs across 13 di¤erent industries, based on data from 2010-2012.
Our results are as striking as they are consistent. Under both estimation strategies, and in all the di¤erent empirical speci…cations considered, cooperatives are found to be signi…- 1 According to the latest (2015) …gures from Cooperatives Europe (Cocolina, 2016) , there are almost 180,000 cooperatives just in Europe, an increase of 9% from 2009. These cooperatives employ more than 4.5 million people and are present in a wide range of sectors. The largest sectors are industry and services (36%), agriculture (30%) and housing (22%) if measured by number of …rms, and agriculture (39%), retail (30%) and consumer (12%) if measured by annual turnover. 2 In terms of market shares, …gures from the European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy/cooperatives/index_en.htm) show that, in several countries, cooperatives are dominant in the agricultural industry (83% in the Netherlands, 79% in Finland, 55% in Italy and 50% in France). In addition, cooperatives are strongly present in industries such as forestry, banking, retail, pharmaceutical and health care, with cooperative market shares in the range of 20-60% in several countries. 3 See Section 2 for a theoretical discussion of cooperatives versus IOFs, and Section 3 for a review of the empirical literature.
2 cantly less productive than IOFs, on average. The di¤erence in productivity is also large in magnitude, with an average productivity di¤erential across all industries of 50 to 60 percent, depending on the exact empirical speci…cation. The underperformance of cooperatives applies to most industries and we are not able to identify any industry in which cooperatives are consistently more productive than their investor-owned counterparts. On the contrary, in seven out of thirteen industries, we …nd that cooperatives would signi…cantly increase their output if they used the same amount of inputs but adopted the (estimated) technology of IOFs, whereas the IOFs would produce signi…cantly less with the same amount of inputs if they adopted the 'cooperative technology'. Interestingly, this result applies to industries across which the share of di¤erent types of cooperatives (worker cooperatives, supplier cooperatives, consumer cooperatives) is known to be very di¤erent. This suggests that the productive e¢ ciency of cooperatives versus IOFs is not particularly related to cooperative type, which is consistent with the fact that many of the theoretical arguments for the e¢ -ciency merits of cooperatives are relatively general in nature and do not apply exclusively to a particular type of cooperative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we place our analysis in a proper theoretical context by o¤ering a precise de…nition of the di¤erence between an IOF and a cooperative and discussing the available theoretical arguments for why IOFs might be more or less productive than cooperatives. In Section 3 we give a relatively brief review of the empirical literature on productivity di¤erences between the two organizational forms.
The data we use are described in Section 4, whereas in Section 5 we present our empirical strategies and corresponding results. The paper is closed with a few concluding remarks in Section 6.
Theoretical context
A …rm is usually owned by someone who transacts with the …rm; a 'patron'of the …rm. As noted by Hansmann (1999) , this is true for both cooperatives and for IOFs. In light of this basic insight, a cooperative can be generally de…ned as a …rm owned by patrons other than those who supply capital to the …rm. A consumer cooperative is owned by its consumers (or a subset of them), whereas a producer cooperative is owned by the suppliers (or a subset of the suppliers) of a particular input to production. 4 In addition, cooperatives are usually characterised by a governance structure where both earnings and votes are distributed to members/owners in proportion to the amount of transactions each member has with the …rm.
Whereas the neoclassical theory of the pro…t-maximising …rm is a standard model used to describe the behaviour of IOFs, there is no such universally accepted 'workhorse model' of the cooperative …rm. In particular, how to de…ne the objective of a cooperative …rm is a long-standing issue in the literature. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to develop a uni…ed theory of cooperatives was made by Carson (1977) , who sets up a general theory of a …rm (a so-called 'G-…rm') that maximises a function that is monotonically increasing in the utilities of its members/owners, and where each member may supply some of the …rm's inputs and/or consume some of its outputs. This implies …rm behaviour that generally lies somewhere between pro…t-maximisation and welfare-maximisation. The former case appears only under perfect competition in all input and output markets. Otherwise, a consumer cooperative would charge lower output prices of its members, and a producer cooperative would pay higher input prices to its members, compared with an IOF (which also appears as a special case of the G-…rm).
How are the e¢ ciency properties of cooperatives likely to di¤er from those of an IOF?
We can conceptually distinguish between three types of e¢ ciency: (i) productive e¢ ciency,
(ii) allocative e¢ ciency, and (iii) scale e¢ ciency. For a given production function, models of cooperatives based on a neoclassical framework, such at the above-described theory of the G-…rm, are in principle able to explain if and how cooperatives and IOFs di¤er in terms of allocative and scale e¢ ciency. For example, the Carson-model predicts that, all else equal, cooperatives will operate at a (weakly) large scale than IOFs. However, such models cannot explain if and how cooperatives di¤er from IOFs with respect to productive e¢ ciency, which is the main question we ask in our empirical analysis. Possible explanations for such di¤erences are mainly based on agency and transaction cost theories.
There are two main agency problems, with potential implications for productive e¢ ciency, related to the running of a …rm: (i) an agency problem between the owner(s) (principal(s)) and the manager (agent), and (ii) an agency problem between the manager (principal) and the suppliers of inputs, including workers (agents). An overview of the agency-based arguments in the literature suggests that the former (latter) agency problem is larger (smaller) in cooperatives than in IOFs.
It is a well-known argument in the literature on labour-managed …rms, which is a particular type of producer cooperative, that the cooperative form of …rm organisation yields a gain in productive e¢ ciency because of reduced agency and monitoring costs in the relationship between managers and workers (which, in the case of labour-managed …rms, are also owners). Employee participation is thought to stimulate incentives for workers to exert more e¤ort, to invest more in …rm-speci…c human capital, and to monitor each other (see, e.g., Estrin and Fakhfakh et al., 2012) . Similar arguments have also been put forward for other types of producer cooperatives, where the …rm is owned by the suppliers of other inputs than labour. Because of a better alignment of interest between the …rm and its suppliers, information rents -and thus procurement costs -are lower for a cooperative than for an IOF. 5 Gains in productive e¢ ciency due to informational advantages have also been claimed for consumer cooperatives. The argument is that consumer-members would be more willing to truthfully reveal information to their cooperative -for example about the types of products and services needed -than to an IOF (see, e.g., Staatz, 1984, and Iskow, 1993) . All of the above arguments can also be thought of as di¤erent variants of the same general argument, namely that a cooperative ownership structure can be seen as a form of vertical integration (either backwards or forwards), which implies lower transaction costs compared to an IOF. 6 On the other hand, a cooperative ownership structure might aggravate the agency problem in the relationship between owners and managers, and thereby lead to lower productive e¢ ciency. At least three di¤erent (but still related) arguments have been put forward in the literature. First, the absence of a cooperative stock market value implies a lack of external information available to measure managerial performance, which in turn implies a larger need for internal monitoring (Porter and Scully, 1987) . Furthermore, incentives for internal monitoring might also be lower in cooperatives because ownership tends to be highly di¤used (Sexton and Iskow, 1993) . Finally, compared with an IOF, it might be more di¢ cult to design managerial incentive schemes in cooperative …rms which align the manager's and the owners'objectives; partly because of the more unclear and di¤use nature of the cooperative's objectives, and partly because of the lack of equity-based management incentives mechanisms (i.e., a stock market value) that are available to IOFs (Ortmann and King, 2007) .
There are also some other arguments derived from a non-neoclassical framework indicating that productive e¢ ciency might be lower in cooperatives than in IOFs. Cook (1995) and Banerjee et al. (2001) , among others, claim that cooperatives are less e¢ cient because of internal rent-seeking, where members engage in (costly) activities in order to increase their share of the generated surplus. Furthermore, the typically higher di¤usion of ownership in cooperatives might lead to lower e¢ ciency due to larger costs of collective decision making (Hansmann, 1999) .
Finally, there is a set of arguments which relate more speci…cally to allocative and scale ine¢ ciencies of cooperatives. Porter and Scully (1987) invoke an agency cost argument in 5 See Bontems and Fulton (2009) for a formal treatment of this argument. 6 See, e.g., Nilsson (2001) for a further discussion.
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claiming that cooperatives are likely to su¤er from scale ine¢ ciencies. Achieving the costminimising scale of operation requires su¢ cient patronage. However, since the cost of control increases as the number of principals (patrons) increases, cooperatives tend to operate at an ine¢ ciently low scale. Regarding potential allocative ine¢ ciencies of cooperatives, a muchdiscussed argument is derived from the so-called 'horizon problem'. Because members of a cooperative bene…t from investments only during the period in which they are members, this might erode incentives to invest in long-lived assets whose productive life is longer than the expected period of cooperative membership. A similar problem does not exist for IOFs, since existing shareholders can always sell their shares at a market value that will re ‡ect the expected present value of future investment returns. This potential horizon problem for cooperative investments has given rise to the 'underinvestment hypothesis', namely that cooperatives will su¤er from allocative ine¢ ciencies due to underinvestment in capital (see, e.g., Iskow, 1993, or Ortmann and King, 2007) . This is also related to the concern that cooperatives will su¤er from capital starvation because of di¢ culties in accessing external …nance and because of members' limited wealth (see Fakfakh et al., 2012, for a further discussion). Contrary to this, though, some authors (e.g., Estrin and Jones, 1992) argue that a cooperative ownership structure could stimulate, through positive externalities among members, the process of collective capital accumulation, leading to the hypothesis that cooperatives will be characterised by relative capital scarcity at the early stages of their life spans, but relative capital abundance in later stages.
A brief literature review
As the discussion in the previous section shows, most of the arguments for why there might be productivity di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs are general in nature and therefore apply, at least to some extent, to all types of cooperative ownership forms. Despite this, the empirical literature on this topic, besides being relatively scant, is divided in two distinctly separate strands. There is a literature focussing exclusively on labour-managed …rms and how this particular type of producer cooperative compare with IOFs in terms of productivity and e¢ ciency. Then there is a parallel literature addressing the same set of questions regarding cooperatives versus IOFs, but focussing exclusively on the agricultural sector.
In the latter strand of the literature, the scope of analysis is not only restricted to the agricultural sector, but many of the studies in this literature are also restricted to one particular industry, namely dairy processing. The results from these studies are somewhat mixed. Porter and Scully (1987) and Ferrier and Porter (1991) Sexton and Iskow (1993) attribute the mixed results partly to a lack of relevant or reliable data in many studies, arguing that this makes it hard to draw strong conclusions. 7 In a more recent study, again based on data from the dairy industry, Soboh et al. (2012) …nd that cooperatives are less e¢ cient when using a traditional measure of input oriented technical e¢ ciency, but show that these di¤erences are reduced (or eliminated) when using an alternative approach that account for di¤erences in …rm objectives emanating from the two types of ownership structure.
The (early) literature on productivity di¤erences between labour-managed …rms and IOFs is nicely summarised by Doucouliagos (1997) , who also performs a meta-analysis based on 23 statistically independent studies. A striking feature of this literature, taken as a whole, is the lack of solid evidence for systematic di¤erences in productivity or e¢ ciency between the two organizational forms. In the studies reviewed by Doucouliagos (1997) , no such di¤erences are found in the …ve studies using production frontier estimates 8 , and in four of the …ve studies using regression techniques to estimate production functions. 9 The only exception is Berman and Berman (1989), who …nd that labour-managed …rms are less productive than IOFs in the US plywood industry. Furthermore, although many individual studies suggest that labourmanaged …rms are less capital-intensive than IOFs, which might imply di¤erences in total factor productivity, these di¤erences disappear in the meta-regressions. A di¤erent conclusion is reached in a more recent paper by Arando et al. (2015) , who perform an econometric case study of the retail chain Eroski, which is part of the Mondragon group of worker cooperatives in the Basque Country of Spain. They …nd that stores with cooperate ownership tend to be more productive than conventional stores with no employee ownership within the same chain.
Besides drawbacks related to lack of data, and besides an absence of a clear pattern of results, a common feature of the studies in both of the above-mentioned strands of the literature is a narrowness of scope. In most studies, the analysis is restricted to a single industry and/or a small sample of …rms. 10 A recent and notable exception is Fakhfakh et al. 7 See also Soboh et al. (2009) for a more comprehensive and updated literature review. 8 Porter and Scully (1987), Cote (1989) , Sterner (1990) , Defourny (1992) and Pollitt (1995) . 9 Sterner (1990), Estrin (1991), Ferrantino et al. (1995) , Pollitt (1995) . 1 0 A literature review summarising the relative performance of cooperatives versus IOFs and integrating both strands of the literature -worker cooperatives and agricultural cooperatives -is provided by Logue and Yates (2006) . However, they apply a somewhat broader concept of performance, beyond 'productivity'in the strict economic meaning of the concept, which allows them to conclude that cooperatives in general perform 7 (2012) who study productivity di¤erences between labour-managed …rms and IOFs using a large and representative sample of French …rms covering several industries. 11 Interestingly, and somewhat in contrast to the received literature, the authors …nd that labour-managed …rms are at least as e¢ cient as IOFs in all industries and that, on average, …rms would produce more if they all adopted the labour-managed …rms'industry-speci…c technologies.
In the present paper, our empirical approach is much the same as in Fakfakh et al.
(2012). The main di¤erence lies in an even wider scope of study, where we include all types of cooperatives and make comparisons across a substantially larger number of industries.
Detailed descriptions of our data and empirical approach are given in the subsequent sections.
Data
We use data from the survey Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas (SCIE), conducted by the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE) for the period 2004-2012. This annual survey includes …rm-level data collected for any entity which produces goods or services in that year, in any economic sector, regardless of its size and legal form. 12 The survey also includes unique …rm identi…ers which allow us to trace …rms over time and conduct panel data analysis. Until 2009, the organizational form of the …rm was given by two broad categories:
Sole Proprietorship ('Empresa em Nome Individual') and Societies ('Sociedades'). However, in 2010 and 2011 this classi…cation was further broken down and includes Cooperatives among thirty di¤erent legal forms of the …rm. SCIE covers around one million …rms every year, with the majority (65-70%) falling in the Sole Proprietorship category. This type of …rm is excluded from our analysis on the grounds that, in practice, many such enterprises operate only on a part-time basis. In our analysis, we want to distinguish between cooperatives and investor-owned …rms. We identify cooperatives directly by the legal form given in the data in 2010 and 2011. The residual group of …rms in the Societies category are then classi…ed as IOFs. 13 Although we are able to accurately determine whether or not a …rm is organized as a cooperative, the data does not contain more detailed information about type of cooperative. However, when interpreting our results, we rely on information from other sources regarding the prevalence of di¤erent types of cooperatives in di¤erent industries in Portugal in order to see whether cross-industry di¤erences in our results are systematically related to the cross-industry distribution of di¤erent cooperative well relative to IOFs. 1 1 Two separate data sets are used, covering seven and four industries, respectively. 1 2 The only exceptions are public administration and …nancial services (banking and insurance), which are excluded from the survey. 1 3 We will also use a narrower de…nition of IOFs as a robustness check.
8 types. As we show in Section 5, there does not appear to be any such relation.
The information in SCIE is gathered from two detailed …nancial statements (balance sheet and income statement), which implies that we have a rich set of information about each …rm. Key variables, apart from type of organization, include gross output, value added, capital stock, employment, industry a¢ liation, regional location and a …rm birth indicator.
In addition, the data set includes workforce characteristics such as gender distribution, share of full-time workers and share of paid workers, and information on whether the …rm provides formal training to the workforce or is involved in research activities. We also know if the …rm is engaged in international trade through import or export activities.
Unfortunately, due to a change in the accounting rules at the start of 2010, the availability and continuity of some relevant variables were not assured. We therefore limit our main analysis to the period from 2010 to 2012, during which all relevant variables are available.
The only exception is the detailed classi…cation of organizational form, which, as mentioned, is only available for 2010 and 2011. We therefore extrapolate, for each …rm, the organizational form of 2010-2011 to 2012 and also make the assumption that …rms born in 2012 are investorowned. 14 In order to facilitate a cross-industry analysis, we also follow the approach of Each …rm in our sample is classi…ed as belonging to one of thirteen di¤erent industries, where this classi…cation of industries is based on a mildly aggregated version of the o¢ cial 2-digit classi…cation. In Figure 1 we display how cooperatives are distributed across these 13 industries. We see that cooperatives are reasonably well represented across a wide spectrum of economic activity. In most industries, the share of cooperatives lies somewhere in the interval of 5-15%. Exceptions are 'textile', 'other manufacturing', 'retail trade'and 'artistic and cultural', where the share of cooperatives is less than 5%. 15 At the other end, cooperatives
are relatively strongly present in industries such as 'food', 'beverages'and 'social work', where they constitute around 15% of the total number of …rms.
[ Figure 1 here]
Mean values of the main variables in our sample are reported in and/or restricted to labour managed …rms. 16 [ Table 1 here]
Cooperatives in Portugal also appear to be more capital intensive than IOFs. This is also con…rmed by more disaggregated …gures, which shows that the capital-labour ratio of cooperatives is at least as high as for IOFs in 10 out of the 13 industries considered in our study. This also runs counter to prior evidence showing that cooperatives tend to be less capital intensive than IOFs (see, e.g., Doucouliagos, 1997, and Jones, 2007) , although, once more, this evidence is mainly restricted to worker cooperatives. 17 The composition of the workforce also di¤ers between the two groups, with cooperatives Regarding the other variables, the considerably lower birth rate of cooperatives relative to IOFs a well-established and documented fact. Another noticeable di¤erence is that, while cooperatives do not di¤er from IOFs in terms of export activities, the share of …rms that import goods is signi…cantly lower for cooperatives than for IOFs. This might re ‡ect the importance of local linkages often associated with cooperatives (Barlett et al., 1992).
Empirical strategy and results
We test for productivity di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs by estimating di¤erent variants of an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function with three inputs (similar to, e.g., Harris et al., 2005) . Our most general speci…cation is given by
where Output is real gross output, Labour is total employment, Capital is tangible …xed assets, M aterials is real intermediate inputs, and COOP is a binary variable that equals one if the …rm is a cooperative. Among the other control variables, W F is a vector of three variables that control for the workforce composition of each …rm. It includes the share of full-time workers, the share of unpaid workers and the gender composition of the workforce.
Furthermore, OF A is a vector of …ve indicator variables used to control whether the …rm provides training, performs R&D activities, is a start-up, or is engaged in international trade through imports or exports. We control for market power by including the variable HHI, which is the Her…ndahl-Hirschman index of market concentration de…ned at the …ve-digit level of economic activity classi…cation in each year. We also add a dummy variable (EA)
indicating the economic activity (based on the 13 industries de…ned in the previous section), and another indicator variable, REG, that is equal to one if the …rm is located in a speci…c region de…ned at NUTS 2 of Portugal. Finally, we include a …rm-…xed e¤ect (a i ) and a year-…xed e¤ect (v t ). Given the wide scope of our analysis, using data from all economic sectors, we convert all …nancial variables to real terms (Prices = 2012) using de ‡ators de…ned according to three broadly homogeneous economic sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and services (source: AMECO).
Estimation strategies
We estimate our production function using two di¤erent estimation strategies. As a benchmark, we use a random-e¤ects model (GLS) applied to our three-year unbalanced panel sample. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random e¤ects clearly rejects OLS estimation, and the presence of the time invariant COOP variable does not allow us to perform a …xed-e¤ects estimation of (1). 18 Thus, we present results from GLS estimations. in di¤erences as instruments (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . Like the GMM estimator, the System-GMM estimator is su¢ ciently ‡exible to account for the endogeneity of inputs and for a possible correlation between unobserved …rm characteristics and organizational form that a¤ects output. 19 However, because the System-GMM estimator exploits additional moment conditions inherent in adopting a system of equations in di¤erences and in levels, it also allows us to recover the e¤ect of the time-invariant COOP variable, which is crucial to our analysis.
Our System-GMM estimations are derived using the following procedure. We eliminate the …rm-…xed e¤ect in the equations in di¤erences using orthogonal deviations instead of a …rst-di¤erence transformation. We choose orthogonal deviations in order to minimise the gap e¤ect in our short and unbalanced panel. 20 The three inputs, the variables regarding In order to test the validity of the instruments used and to support the prefer-ence for the System-GMM approach over the original di¤erence-GMM, we report the Hansen and the di¤erence-in-Hansen statistics. Finally, we report statistics that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, using a two-step GMM estimation procedure, following the correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
Results
We estimate total factor productivity of cooperatives versus IOFs under three di¤erent -and increasingly ‡exible -assumptions. First, we make the rather strong assumption that any productivity di¤erential between the two organizational forms is common across all industries.
This assumption will subsequently be relaxed when we estimate di¤erences in total factor productivity for each industry separately. In both cases, it is assumed that the production function of cooperatives and IOFs potentially di¤er only with respect to the intercept. Under our …nal and most ‡exible assumption, we also allow for the possibility that cooperatives and
IOFs have di¤erent production functions (i.e., that the input parameters ( 1 , 2 and 3 ) of (1) are speci…c to the type of organizational form). In all three cases, we present results from both GLS and System-GMM estimations.
Common productivity di¤erential across industries
Suppose that the productivity di¤erential between cooperatives and IOFs is common for all economic sectors and can be captured by the single binary variable COOP . This implies that we constrain the parameters of (1) to be the same for both types of …rms -cooperatives and
IOFs -and across all industries. Under these assumptions, estimation results for di¤erent variants of (1) are presented in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 here]
In Column 1 we report GLS estimates when the model, apart from the dummy variable COOP , includes only the three inputs and the variables that capture the unobservable e¤ect of industry, region and time. In subsequent columns, we show similar estimates when more controls are cumulatively added to the model, such as workforce composition (Column 2), …rm attributes on training, R&D and start-up (Column 3), information on imports/exports (Column 4), and information on market concentration (Column 5).
The main message that emerges from Table 2 is that, in contrast to the summary statistics of Table 1 , cooperatives seem to be considerably less productive than their investor-owned counterparts, with a productivity di¤erential of close to 50%. This result is fairly robust across all speci…cations. The estimated input parameters ( 1 ; 2 and 3 ) are also stable 13 across di¤erent speci…cations. The remaining coe¢ cients appear with the expected sign and are all statistically signi…cant at the one percent level. Output increases (decreases) with the share of full-time (unpaid) workers, and is also higher in …rms that provide training and engage in R&D. Involvement in international trade, in particular exports, is also associated with higher output. This accords with the well-known empirical …ndings that exporters tend to be among the most productive …rms. 21 Firms are also less productive in their …rst year of activity and tend to be more productive when operating in more concentrated industries.
Finally, there also appears to be a small productivity advantage associated with a higher share of male workers, but the statistical signi…cance of this relationship is relatively weak.
[ Table 3 here]
In Table 3 we report some robustness results using the same empirical strategy (GLS) and maintaining the assumption of a common aggregate productivity di¤erential between cooperatives and IOFs that applies to all industries. In Column 1 we reports coe¢ cient estimates of (1) when total productivity is alternatively measured by real value-added (instead of real gross output), which implies that M aterials is excluded as an independent variable in (1). The estimated productivity di¤erential remains large (around 41%) and statistically signi…cant. Notice that this variable is not constructed but given directly by the data set and available for a somewhat larger number of …rms (compared to the sample size in Table 2 ).
Another robustness check is to explore if an how our results are a¤ected by our de…nition of IOFs. So far we have de…ned IOFs as a residual category consisting of all …rms that are not classi…ed as cooperatives in the data. In Column 2 we report the estimated coe¢ cients when we adopt a narrower de…nition, where a …rm is classi…ed as an IOF if, in the data, it is listed as a private or public liability company. 22 Whereas the number of …rms drops by around 9%, the productivity di¤erential between cooperatives and IOFs remains almost unchanged.
The results in Table 2 IOFs, our productivity di¤erential estimate reported in Table 2 is likely to be downward biased. In Column 3 of Table 3 we report coe¢ cient estimates based on data from only 2010
and 2011, for which we have exact information about organizational form. The estimated coe¢ cient for the COOP variable provides some evidence for our above explained conjecture, since it gives a slightly higher estimate for the productivity di¤erential between cooperatives and IOFs when only actual information on organizational form in 2010-2011 is used.
Finally, we explore if and how productivity di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs depend on …rm size. We do this by splitting the sample into two categories: micro …rms (de…ned as …rms with less than ten workers) and larger …rms (with a workforce of at least ten workers). The results are presented in Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3 and reveal that the aggregate productivity di¤erential is signi…cant and large for both size categories, though somewhat smaller for micro …rms.
We now turn to estimation results using the System-GMM approach, which, in principle, allows us to circumvent the notorious endogeneity problems associated with the estimation of production functions. The results from this estimation strategy, more elaborately explained above, are reported in Table 4 , where Column 1 is the counterpart of Column 5 in Table 2, and Columns 2 and 3 are the counterparts of Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3 .
[ Table 4 here] Interestingly, when controlling for endogeneity by using a System-GMM approach, the estimated di¤erence in total factor productivity between the two organizational forms increases considerably, with cooperatives being, on average, 65% less productive than IOFs.
Furthermore, the di¤erence between micro …rms and larger …rms vanishes.
Industry-speci…c productivity di¤erentials
We now relax the restriction of a common productivity di¤erential across industries and run separate regressions of (1) for each of the 13 industries speci…ed in Section 4. The results from these regressions are shown in Table 5 , were we report both GLS and System-GMM estimates.
[ Table 5 here]
The …rst general observation to make from the results in Table 5 is that, although there is considerable variation across industries, there is no industry in which cooperatives are found to be more productive than IOFs, regardless of whether the productivity di¤erential is estimated by GLS or System-GMM. Focussing on the GLS estimates, the results in Table 5 reveal that cooperatives are signi…cantly less productive than their investor-owned counterparts in 9 out of 13 industries (in the most general speci…cation), with the negative productivity 15 di¤erential being particularly large in industries such as 'agriculture', 'electricity, water and construction', 'social work'and 'artistic and cultural associations'.
It is also interesting to note that the underperformance of cooperatives is consistent across very di¤erent sectors, with a very di¤erent representation of cooperatives in terms of type.
For example, supplier-owned cooperatives is the dominant type of cooperative in industries such as 'agriculture' and 'artistic and cultural associations', whereas the vast majority of cooperatives in 'textile and clothing'are labour-managed …rms. On the other hand, in 'electricity and construction', consumer cooperatives, worker cooperatives and supplier-owned cooperatives coexist. 23 The fact that the estimated productivity di¤erential is negative and large in all these industries suggest that the productive ine¢ ciency of cooperatives applies to all cooperative types. A similar argument can be made based on the industries in which cooperatives and IOFs are found to be equally productive. For example, cooperatives in 'beverages'and 'other associations'are predominantly supplier-owned cooperatives, whereas 'other manufacturing'and 'storage, hotels and media'have a signi…cant presence of all types of cooperatives. Thus, whether cooperatives are equally or less productive than IOFs does not seem to depend particularly on the type of cooperative. This result is consistent with our theoretical discussion in Section 2 where we show that many of the agency-based arguments regarding the productive (in)e¢ ciency of cooperatives are general in nature, and do not exclusively apply to a particular type of cooperative.
The above described results are broadly con…rmed by the estimated productivity di¤eren-tials obtained from the System-GMM approach. Overall, the magnitude of the productivity di¤erential changes little between the two empirical approaches, though some coe¢ cients are less precisely estimated with System-GMM. The most important di¤erences appear in the two industries 'textile and clothing'and 'artistic and cultural', where the coe¢ cients are not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Allowing for technology di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs
Whether estimating a single production function for the entire economy or separate production functions for each industry, we have so far assumed that cooperatives and IOFs have the same technology (apart from the production function having potentially di¤erent intercepts).
However, most of the agency-based arguments for why cooperatives and IOFs might di¤er in terms of productive e¢ ciency are related to incentive e¤ects that might be embodied in the production factors of the two organizational forms. This implies that cooperatives and IOFs might simply have di¤erent technologies; i.e., their production functions might di¤er beyond a di¤erence in intercepts. In order to explore this possibility, we now estimate (1) for each industry, were we also allow the input parameters 1 , 2 and 3 to di¤er between cooperatives and IOFs.
When we estimate di¤erent production functions for cooperatives and IOFs, we can no longer measure di¤erences in total factor productivity by a single coe¢ cient. Instead, we follow the approach of Fakhfakh et al. (2012) and compare the predicted output of cooperatives and IOFs using, in turn, each of the two sets of estimated parameters. In other words, we keep the estimated technology constant and calculate whether cooperatives (IOFs), with their respective input use, will produce more or less with their own technology compared with the technology of IOFs (cooperatives).
The predicted outputs of each type of …rm, when using each of the two estimated technologies, are given in Table 6 (based on GLS estimates) and Table 7 (based on System-GMM estimates). In each table, and for each of the two types of …rms, the actual output is reported in the …rst column, whereas, in the second column, we show the predicted (counterfactual) output in case the …rms (cooperatives or IOFs) use the same amount of each input, but adopt the technology of the other type of …rms. A statistical comparison between these two results is obtained with a t-test and, in each table, a value displayed in italics indicate that output is (statistically signi…cantly) larger when …rms of a given type use their own technology.
[ Table 6 here]
The overall picture that emerges from the GLS-estimates in Table 6 is very clear. The output of cooperatives is consistently lower than the predicted output if these …rms would change the way they organise production by adopting the (estimated) technology of IOFs.
And vice versa, for a given input use, IOFs consistently produce more with their own technology that what they would have done if they adopted the cooperative way of production.
The only exception from this pattern is for 'other associations', where the cooperatives in this industry produce more with their own technology, although the di¤erence is only weakly signi…cant. Thus, when allowing for di¤erent technologies between the two organizational types, the previously presented results of IOFs outperforming cooperatives are very much con…rmed. If anything, the results are stronger, since the relative ine¢ ciency of cooperatives now applies to practically all industries.
[ Table 7 here]
The System-GMM results (presented in Table 7 ) con…rm to a large extent the results based on GLS estimations, although the picture is now slightly more mixed. IOFs perform signi…cantly better with their own technology than with the cooperative technology in 10 out of 13 industries, whereas cooperatives perform signi…cantly better with their own technology only in two industries: 'beverages' and 'other manufacturing'. In 8 out of 13 industries, cooperatives would perform signi…cantly better if they adopted the way of production used by their investor-owned counterparts. Perfectly consistent results, in terms of symmetry, are obtained for 'agriculture', 'food', 'electricity, water and construction', 'retail trade', 'education', 'social work'and 'artistic and cultural associations'. In each of these seven industries, cooperatives (IOFs) would perform signi…cantly better (worse) if they adopted the alternative technology. With the exception of 'artistic and cultural associations', this set of industries also corresponds perfectly to the set of industries in which IOFs have a signi…cantly higher total factor productivity than cooperatives (based on System-GMM estimations) when the parameters of the production function (apart from the intercept) are constrained to be the same for the two types of …rms (cf. Table 5 ). Given that the prevalence of di¤erent types of cooperatives is very di¤erent across these particular industries, these results serve as a further indication that productivity di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs are not systematically linked to a particular type of cooperative.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have empirically analysed if cooperatives are superior to investor-owned …rms (IOFs) in terms of productive e¢ ciency. We have done so by using panel data methods to estimate di¤erences in total factor productivity between the two categories of …rms, based on three years (2010-2012) of …rm-level data covering a wide range of Portuguese industries.
Estimations from our benchmark random-e¤ects model produce strong and consistent results. Cooperatives are, on average, considerably less productive than their investor-owned counterparts, and this result applies to a vast majority of the thirteen industries considered.
These results are to a large extent con…rmed when we estimate a System-GMM model to control for the endogeneity of the input and output variables.
Since we estimate several di¤erent speci…cations of two di¤erent empirical models, running separate regressions for each of thirteen di¤erent industries, it is not surprising that our results display some degree of variability across speci…cations and across industries. In fact, we think our results are surprisingly consistent, particularly across industries. We are able to identify six industries -'agriculture', 'food', 'electricity, water and construction', 'retail trade', 'education' and 'social work' -where our results are perfectly consistent across all empirical speci…cations. In each of these industries, cooperatives would produce signi…cantly more with their current use of inputs, if they operated as IOFs (i.e., if the cooperatives adopted the estimated production technology of IOFs). And vice versa, IOFs would produce signi…cantly less with the same amount of inputs if they instead adopted the cooperative way of production. On the other hand, there is no industry were cooperatives are found to be consistently more productive than IOFs.
The consistency of our results across a wide range of industries is interesting, particularly since the predominant type of cooperative is known to be very di¤erent across these industries.
This suggests that the underperformance of cooperatives is not particularly related to the type of cooperative (worker cooperative, supplier cooperative or consumer cooperative, for example), which is also consistent with the fact that several of the theoretical arguments for why cooperatives might be less productive than IOFs are rather general in nature and do not apply exclusively to a particular type of cooperative.
By way of conclusion, we must of course acknowledge that our analysis are not without weaknesses, which implies that some caution is needed when interpreting our results. Perhaps the main drawback is our short panel, with three years of data. Although the availability of some key variables for a longer time period (prior to 2010) enables us to perform System-GMM estimations based on the three-year panel, the fact that some of the productivity coe¢ cients from these estimations are less precisely estimated can probably be attributed to the shortness of the panel. Ideally we would also like to have data on the type of cooperatives, although, as mentioned above, our results seem to give indirect evidence to the hypothesis that the productive ine¢ ciency of cooperatives is not con…ned to a particular type of cooperative. Notes: *** and * indicate that the means differences are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.
The System-GMM is estimated with two-steps using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. The dependent variable is log of real gross output. 
GLS random estimates
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.
In the GLS random estimates, the standard errors are clustered at firm level. The System-GMM is estimated with two-steps using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. The number of instruments used in each industry-entry varies between 30 and 43. Neither the Hansen overidentification test nor the difference in Hansen tests between the System and first difference GMM reject the validity of the instruments used (further details available upon request). 
